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ABSTRACT
In this paper, a game theoretic approach is used to derive the
optimal power allocation in multiple access channels (MAC) for
decentralized systems. Unlike previous results, a simple coor-
dination mechanism is used between selfish users. The nature
and influence of the coordination mechanism is studied in details
for single antenna and multiple antenna terminals. In the pro-
posed framework, the coordination signal indicates to the users
in which order the receiver applies successive interference cance-
lation and with which frequency this order is used: it establishes
the rule of the game. Remarkably, in Gaussian single input sin-
gle output MACs, it is shown that, whatever the rule of the game,
the selfish behavior of the users leads to a socially efficient net-
work that is to say it is always sum-capacity achieving. However,
for fast fading MAC with multi-antenna terminals, there can be
a performance gap between the decentralized system and its cen-
tralized counterpart. Analytical and simulation results are pro-
vided to assess this gap.
1. INTRODUCTION
In this paper, we consider a special case of decentralized wire-
less networks, the decentralized multiple access channel (MAC).
In this specific context, the MAC consists of a network of sev-
eral mobile stations (MS) and one fixed base station (BS). The
network is said to be decentralized in the sense that the base
station does not dictate to the users the information rates and
transmit power levels. Hence, each user can choose freely
its power allocation policy in order to selfishly maximize a
certain individual performance criterion.
The problem of decentralized power allocation in wireless
networks is not new and has been properly formalized for the
first time in [1]. Interestingly, the problem can be formulated
quite naturally as a non-cooperative game with different per-
formance criteria (utilities) such as the carrier to interference
ratio [2], aggregate throughput [3] or energy efficiency [4][5].
In this paper, the point of view adopted is close to the one
proposed by the authors of [6] for the DSL (digital subscriber
lines) systems, [7] for the single input single output (SISO)
and the single input multiple output (SIMO) fast fading mul-
tiple access channels with CSIR, CSIT (Channel State Infor-
mation at the Transmitter and Receiver) and [8] for MIMO
(Multiple Input Multiple Output) with CSIR but only channel
distribution information at the transmitters (CDIT). More pre-
cisely, we assume, as in [7], that the users want to maximize
information-theoretic utilities and more precisely their trans-
mission rate. However our approach differs from [7] on sev-
eral key technical points. In [7] the authors proposed differ-
ent formulations (in particular the hierarchical and repeated
games formulations) to try to obtain achievable rate regions
as close as possible to the centralized MAC capacity region.
The corresponding formulations and assumptions made, espe-
cially that of the knowledge of all the instantaneous channels
at each mobile station, is not applicable to large decentralized
networks. In this paper, two key assumptions are made in
order to further minimize base station signaling towards the
mobiles: the base station can only send to the users a sim-
ple coordination signal and sufficient training signals for the
users to know the statistics of the different channels. If the
channels are stationary the training data will be sent once and
for all. The assumed coordination signal is simple because it
consists in sending periodically the realization of a K!-state
random signal, where K is the number of active users.
Additionally to the assumptions just mentioned, we will
assume that both the mobile and base stations are equipped
with multiple antennas. Therefore we make the same assump-
tions as [8] where the authors investigated non-cooperative
and non-coordinated MIMO MACs when single-user decod-
ing is assumed at the base station. In our framework the
main objective is to know how well a non-cooperative but
weakly coordinated system performs in terms of overall sum-
rate w.r.t. its centralized counterpart when successive decod-
ing is used at the base station. In this setting, several interest-
ing questions arise.
• When the user’s utility functions are chosen to be their
individual transmission rate, is there a Nash equilib-
rium in the corresponding game and is it unique?
• What is the optimum way of allocating spatially and
temporally the transmit power for a selfish user?
• How do choose the coordination signal in order for the
network sum-rate to be maximized?
In Sec. 2, we begin by considering the SISO static mul-
tiple access channel, which is a simple case that provides in-
sights on the stated issues. Then, in Sec. 3 we consider a
more attractive framework for wireless networks, which is the
fast fading MIMO MAC channel. First we outline the gen-
eral problem which consists in determining for each user, its
optimal space-time power distribution. Then we restrict our
attention to two important special cases. In the first case, the
spatial correlation between the transmit antennas is assumed
to be absent. In this case the optimal spatial power alloca-
tion is the uniform power allocation, and the time allocation
problem is studied. For the second case, we assume that the
temporal power allocation is uniform and thus our objective
is to derive the best spatial power allocation scheme. Numer-
ical results are provided in Sec. 4. We conclude by several
remarks and possible extensions of our work.
Note: for simplicity sake and without loss of generality,
we will assume MACs with two users. However, all the re-
sults presented in this paper extend to K−user MACs, K ≥
3. In this respect, in some places K will be used instead of
K = 2.
2. GAUSSIAN SISO MULTIPLE ACCESS CHANNELS
In this section we consider a simple case of MACs that cap-
tures several important aspects of the problem and serves as
baseline example. The two links between the two mobile and
base stations are assumed to be static, namely additive white
Gaussian (AWGN) channels. We also assume terminals with
single antennas. The main feature of the system under inves-
tigation is that the base station sends a coordination signal to
the (two) users. To generate this signal the base station flips
a coin and transmits the corresponding bit, which does not
always convey one information bit. Indeed, as this coin is
not necessarily fair, it provides a degree of freedom for the
base station for optimizing the system performance. The re-
alization of the random signal indicates in which order the
base station decodes the users with a perfect successive in-
terference canceler. Note that in a real wireless system the
frequency to which the coin would be tossed is roughly pro-
portional to the inverse of the channel coherence time. In
the special case of the AWGN MAC, the links are static and
therefore the coherence time is infinite.
In order to translate mathematically the proposed coor-
dination scheme, let us denote by S ∈ S the coordination
signal where S = {1, 2} is the set of realizations of S and
Pr[S = 1] = p (resp. Pr[S = 2] = 1 − p) is the probability
that user 1 (resp. user 2) is decoded the second and therefore
sees no multiple access interference. The signal received by
the base station for the realization s ∈ {1, 2} of the coordina-
tion signal writes as:
Y (s) =
2∑
k=1
hkX
(s)
k + Z
(s) (1)
where hk the channel gain for user k, X
(s)
k is the signal trans-
mitted by user k when the realization of the coordination sig-
nal is s, and for all s, Z(s) ∼ N (0, σ2) is the (stationary)
channel noise. Note that the channel gains are assumed to be
known both from the transmitters and receiver. As these gain
do not vary over time in this section, acquiring the knowledge
of them is not a critical issue here. This can be done once
and for all with an arbitrary small loss for the average trans-
mission rate. The chosen transmit power constraints are as
follows:
∀k ∈ {1, 2}, pE
∣∣∣X(1)k ∣∣∣2 + pE ∣∣∣X(2)k ∣∣∣2 ≤ Pk (2)
We will use the following notations: p1 = p, p1 = p =
1 − p, p2 = p = 1 − p and p2 = p. Also, let pkαk de-
note the fraction that user k dedicates to the situation where
he sees an interference-free channel i.e. E
∣∣∣X(1)1 ∣∣∣2 = α1P1
and E
∣∣∣X(2)2 ∣∣∣2 = α2P2. Thus the strategy of a user consists
in choosing αk in order to maximize its utility which is his
individual average transmission rate. The utility function for
user k ∈ {1, 2} is given by:
uk(αk, α−k) = pk log (1 + αkηk)+pk log
[
1 +
(1− αkpk)ηk
pk(1 + η−kα−k)
]
(3)
where the notation a−k stands for the value of the quantity a
for the other user and ηk =
|hk|
2Pk
σ2
. Given the fact that each
user wants to maximize its own utility uk w.r.t. αk ∈
[
0, 1
pk
]
,
the main issue is to know if there exists an equilibrium (i.e. no
user has interest in deviating from this point), if it is unique
and how to determine the corresponding pair of parameters
(α∗1, α
∗
2). In fact, the existence and uniqueness of a Nash
equilibrium (NE) issues can be dealt with by applying The-
orem 1 and 2 of [9] in our context.
Existence of a Nash equilibrium. The existence is in-
sured because of the geometrical and topological properties
of the functions uk, and of the set over which the maximiza-
tion is performed. For each user k ∈ {1, 2}, the function uk
is (strictly) concave in αk and continuous in (α1, α2). For
each user k ∈ {1, 2}, the set of feasible actions or strategies
Ak =
[
0, 1
pk
]
is convex and compact. The conditions of [9]
for the existence of a NE are therefore met.
Uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. Here, our goal is to
prove that the diagonally strict concavity condition of [9] is
met in our context and therefore there is a unique NE. For all
(α′1,α
′′
1 ) ∈ A
2
1 and (α
′
2,α
′′
2 ) ∈ A
2
2 such that either α
′
1 6= α
′′
1
or α′2 6= α
′′
2 we want to prove that:
C =
{
(α′′1 − α
′
1)
[
∂u1
∂α1
(α′1, α
′
2)−
∂u1
∂α1
(α′′1 , α
′′
2 )
]
(4)
+(α′′2 − α
′
2)
[
∂u2
∂α2
(α′1, α
′
2)−
∂u2
∂α2
(α′′1 , α
′′
2 )
]}
> 0.
By denoting the two terms of each utility function of eq. (3)
as uk = R
(1)
k + R
(2)
k the strict positivity condition can be
rewritten as follows:
C = pT1 + (1− p)T2 > 0 (5)
where for all s ∈ {1, 2},
Ts = (α
′′
1 − α
′
1)
[
∂R
(s)
1
∂α1
(α′1, α
′
2)−
∂R
(s)
1
∂α1
(α′′1 , α
′′
2 )
]
(6)
+(α′′2 − α
′
2)
[
∂R
(s)
2
∂α2
(α′1, α
′
2)−
∂R
(s)
2
∂α2
(α′′1 , α
′′
2 )
]
.
The term T1 can be re-expressed and shown to be positive:
T1 =
{
p(α′′1−α
′
1)
2η21
(1+α′1η1)(1+α
′′
1 η1)
+
p(1−p)2(α′′2−α
′
2)
2η22−(α
′′
1−α
′
1)(α
′′
2−α
′
2)p
2(1−p)η1η2
(p(1+α′1η1)+η2−η2(1−p)α
′
2)(p(1+α
′′
1 η1)+η2−η2(1−p)α
′′
2 )
}
≥
p3(α′′1−α
′
1)
2η21+p(1−p)
2(α′′2−α
′
2)
2η22−p
2(1−p)(α′′1−α
′
1)(α
′′
2−α
′
2)η1η2
(p(1+α′1η1)+η2−η2(1−p)α
′
2)(p(1+α
′′
1 η1)+η2−η2(1−p)α
′′
2 )
> 0
(7)
In the same way, T2 can be shown to be positive, which con-
cludes the proof of the uniqueness of the NE.
Determination of the Nash equilibrium. In order to find
the optimal selfish strategies in the sets of actions A1 and
A2 we introduce four Lagrange multipliers (λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4) ∈
[0,+∞[4 and define the two constrained functions{
L1(α1, α2, λ1) = −u1(α1, α2) + λ1(α1 −
1
p
)− λ2α1
L2(α1, α2, λ2) = −u2(α1, α2) + λ3(α2 −
1
1−p )− λ4α2.
(8)
The Kuhn-Tucker (KT) conditions write as:

λ1
(
α∗1 −
1
p
)
= 0
λ2α
∗
1 = 0
λ3
(
α∗2 −
1
1−p
)
= 0
λ4α
∗
2 = 0.
(9)
By setting the derivative of the constrained utility functions to
zero (8) and using the KT conditions (9) one can check that
the pair of parameters at the Nash equilibrium is given by:
(α∗1, α
∗
2) =
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
(
1
p
, 11−p
)
if η2
η1
= 1−p
p(
1
p
, 1 + η1
η2
)
if η2
η1
> 1−p
p(
1 + η2
η1
, 11−p
)
if η2
η1
< 1−p
p
.
(10)
Interestingly, we observe that for a fixed game rule, which
is the value of parameter p, there will always be an equilib-
rium. The users adapt their strategies to the rule of the game
accordingly to eq. (10) in order to optimize their individual
transmission rates (3). The base station can therefore choose
p to optimize the overall network performance:
p∗ = arg max
p
Rsum(p) (11)
where Rsum(p) = u1 [α
∗
1(p), α
∗
2(p)] + u2 [α
∗
1(p), α
∗
2(p)]. It
can be checked that for the tree regimes we defined from the
ratio η2
η1
(see eq. (10)), at the equilibrium, the sum-rate is a
constant and Rsum(p) = log(1 + η1 + η2). In fact, this con-
stant is the sum-capacity of the centralized Gaussian SISO
MAC. This shows that for any rule of the game, even if it is
unfair, the selfish behavior of the users will always lead to
maximizing the network sum-rate. Of course, the base sta-
tion can always chose p = 12 (fair coin) in order to make the
game fair without affecting the network performance in the
case of Gaussian SISO multiples access channels. However,
in general, the proven result means that any binary coordina-
tion signal can be used (1-bit quantization of an FM signal,
pseudo-random noise generator, etc.) without loss of global
optimality.
One can easily check that varying p from 0 to 1 allows
one to move along the sum-rate (or full cooperation) segment
of centralized Gaussian MAC capacity region, which is a pen-
tagon. The main question that arises is to know to what extent
the obtained results apply to the fading MIMOMAC. Indeed,
it is known that for the centralized fading MIMO channels,
there is generally only one point where the sum-capacity is
achieved and therefore there must be some differences to be
identified. This is the purpose of the next section.
3. LARGE FADING MIMOMULTIPLE ACCESS
CHANNELS
3.1. System Model
Notations: The notations v and M will stand for vector and
matrix respectively. The superscripts (.)T and (.)H will de-
note transpose and transpose conjugate, respectively. The
trace of the matrix M will be denoted by Tr(M).
Now each mobile station is equipped with nt antennas
whereas the base station has nr antennas (thus we assume
the same number of transmitting antennas for all the users).
In our analysis the flat fading channel matrices of the differ-
ent links vary from symbol vector (or space-time codeword)
to symbol vector. We assume that the receiver knows all the
channel matrices whereas each transmitter has only access to
the statistics of the different channels. The equivalent base-
band signal received by the base station can be written as
y(s)(τ) =
K∑
k=1
Hk(τ)x
(s)
k (τ) + z
(s)(τ) (12)
where x
(s)
k (τ) is the nt-dimensional column vector of sym-
bols transmitted by user k at time τ for the realization s of
the coordination signal, Hk(τ) ∈ C
nr×nt is the channel ma-
trix (stationary and ergodic process) of user k and z(s)(τ) is
a nr-dimensional complex white Gaussian noise distributed
as N (0, σ2Inr ). For sake of clarity we will omit the time in-
dex τ from our notations. In order to take into account the
antenna correlation effects at the transmitters and receiver we
will assume the different channel matrices to be structured
according to the Kronecker propagation model [10]:
∀k ∈ {1, ...,K}, Hk = R
1
2 ΘkT
1
2
k (13)
where R is the receive antenna correlation matrix, Tk is the
transmit antenna correlation matrix for user k and Θk is an
nr × nt matrix whose entries are zero-mean independent and
identically distributed complex Gaussian random variables with
variance 1
nt
.
3.2. Space-time power allocation game
Now, in the vector case, the strategy of user k ∈ {1, 2}, con-
sists in choosing the best pair of precoding matrices Q
(s)
k =
E
[
x
(s)
k x
(s),H
k
]
, for s ∈ {1, 2}, in the sense of his utility func-
tion:
u1(Q
(1)
1 ,Q
(2)
1 Q
(1)
2 ,Q
(2)
2 ) = pR
(1)
1 (Q
(1)
1 ,Q
(1)
2 )
+(1− p)R
(2)
1 (Q
(2)
1 ,Q
(2)
2 )
u2(Q
(1)
1 ,Q
(2)
1 Q
(1)
2 ,Q
(2)
2 ) = pR
(1)
2 (Q
(1)
1 ,Q
(1)
2 )
+(1− p)R
(2)
2 (Q
(2)
1 ,Q
(2)
2 )
(14)
where
R
(1)
1 (Q
(1)
1 ,Q
(1)
2 ) = E log |I + ρH1Q
(1)
1 H
H
1 |
R
(1)
2 (Q
(1)
1 ,Q
(1)
2 ) = E log |I + ρH1Q
(1)
1 H
H
1 + ρH2Q
(1)
2 H
H
2 |
−E log |I + ρH1Q
(1)
1 H
H
1 |
R
(2)
1 (Q
(2)
1 ,Q
(2)
2 ) = E log |I + ρH1Q
(2)
1 H
H
1 + ρH2Q
(2)
2 H
H
2 |
−E log |I + ρH2Q
(2)
2 H
H
2 |
R
(2)
2 (Q
(2)
1 ,Q
(2)
2 ) = E log |I + ρH2Q
(2)
2 H
H
2 |
(15)
with ρ = 1
σ2
The main point to mention here is the power
constraint under which the utilities are maximized. The vector
version of the power constraint given in eq. (2) is:
∀k ∈ {1, 2}, pTr(Q
(1)
k ) + pTr(Q
(2)
k ) ≤ ntPk (16)
Obviously the optimum precoding matricesQ
(s,∗)
k (with (k, s) ∈
{1, 2}2) will depend on p. The problem of finding the cor-
responding matrices Q
(s,∗)
k (p) and then optimizing the sys-
tem sum-rate w.r.t. p is doable but requires more space to be
treated properly. In this paper we will restrict our attention to
two special but interesting cases:
1. Assumption 1. We assume the absence of spatial corre-
lation between the transmit antennas i.e. ∀k ∈ {1, 2},
Tk = I. Under this assumption, using the fact that
the payoff functions are strictly concave, and extend-
ing the results given in [11] for the single user channel,
we obtain that the optimum precoding matrices are pro-
portional to the nt –dimensional identity matrix (uni-
form spatial allocation), which allows us to convert the
space-time power allocation problem into a purely tem-
poral allocation problem (Sec. 3.3).
2. Assumption 2. Here we assume that the user are free
to share their transmit power between their antennas
but for each realization of the coordination signal the
transmit power is constrained as follows (uniform time
power allocation):
∀k ∈ {1, 2}, ∀s ∈ {1, 2}, Tr(Q
(s)
k ) ≤ ntPk. (17)
This is a pure spatial power allocation problem (Sec.
3.4 ).
3.3. Temporal power allocation game
Under Assumption 1, the power constraint (16) becomes:
pα
(1)
k + pα
(2)
k ≤ 1, (18)
which is exactly the power constraint we had for Gaussian
SISO channels (see eq. (2)). We will use the same notations
as in Sec. 2 (e.g. α
(1)
1 = α1). From now on, we can inves-
tigate the same issues as in Sec. 2: the existence of a NE,
its uniqueness, its determination and its social efficiency. Be-
cause of the lack of space we will not provide all the details
of the proofs but only a sketch of them.
Existence of a Nash equilibrium. We apply [9] in our
matrix case. Without loss of generality, let us consider user
1. The utility of user 1 comprises two terms corresponding
to the two coordination signal realizations: u1(α1, α2) =
p1R
(1)
1 + p1R
(2)
1 . One can check that:
∂2R
(1)
1
∂α21
(α1, α2) = −ETr[BB
H ] < 0
∂2R
(2)
1
∂α21
(α1, α2) = −ETr[CC
H ] < 0
(19)
where
B = ρ1H
H
1 (I + ρ1α1H1H
H
1 )
−1H1
C = p
1−p
ρ1H
H
1 (I + ρ1
1−pα1
1−p
H1H
H
1 + ρ2α2H2H
H
2 )
−1H1
(20)
with ρk ,
Pk
σ2
. Thus for each k, the utility uk is strictly con-
cave w.r.t. to αk. Also it is continuous in (α1, α2) over the
convex and compact sets Ak =
[
1, 1
pk
]
. Therefore the exis-
tence of a NE is guaranteed.
Uniqueness of the Nash equilibrium. We always apply [9]
in our matrix case and prove that the diagonally strict con-
cavity condition is always met. The key of the proof is the
following Lemma which will not be proved here.
Lemma 3.1 Let A′, A′′, B′ and B′′ be Hermitian and posi-
tive definite matrices such that either A′ 6= A′′ or B′ 6= B′′.
Then we have Tr(M + N) > 0 where
M = (A′′ −A′)
[
(I + A′)−1 − (I + A′′)−1
]
N = (B′ −B′′)
[
(I + B′′ + A′′)−1 − (I + B′ + A′)−1
]
.
(21)
The uniqueness of the NE can then be proved by following
the same steps as in the SISO case. The diagonally strict con-
cavity condition can exactly be written as equation (5) but in
the matrix case T1 can be checked to be equal to Tr(M + N)
with
M = (A′′ −A′)
[
(I + A′)−1 − (I + A′′)−1
]
N = (B′ −B′′)
[
(I + B′′ + A′′)−1 − (I + B′ + A′)−1
]
A′ = ρ1α
′
1H1H
H
1
A′′ = ρ1α
′′
1H1H
H
1
B′ = ρ2
1−(1−p)α′2
p
H2H
H
2
B′′ = ρ2
1−(1−p)α′′2
p
H2H
H
2 .
(22)
By using Lemma 3.1 twice, one can prove that T1 and T2 are
positive, which ensures the unconditional uniqueness of the
NE in the considered game.
Determination of the Nash equilibrium. In order to obtain
the NE, we exploit a large system approach, derived in [12]
for the fading single user channels. This will lead us to sim-
ple approximations of the utility functions which are easier
to optimize. From now on we assume the asymptotic regime
in terms of the number of antennas: nt −→ ∞, nr −→ ∞,
and lim
nt→∞,nr→∞
nt
nr
= c < ∞. Under these assumptions, for
s = 1 (the expressions for s = 2 can be written in a similar
way) and each k ∈ {1, 2}, the rates R
1)
k can be can be shown
to be equivalent to [12]:
R˜
(1)
1 = nt log2(1 + ρ1α1γ1)+
+nr log2 (cγ1)− ntγ1 (cγ1 − 1) log2 e
R˜
(1)
2 = nt log2(1 + ρ1α1γ1)+
+nt log2
[
1 + 2ρ2
1−(1−p)α2
p
γ2
]
+
+nr log2 (2cγ2)− 4ntγ2 (cγ2 − 1) log2 e
−R˜
(1)
1
(23)
where the parameters γj , j ∈ {1, 2} are solutions of the fol-
lowing 2−degree equations:
γ1 =
nr
nt
1
1 + ρ α1P1
1+ρα1P1γ1
γ2 =
nr
nt
1
+ρ
(
α1P1
1+2ρα1P1γ2
+ (1−(1−p)α2)P2
p+2ρ(1−(1−p)α2)P2γ2
) (24)
The approximates of R˜
(1)
2 and R˜
(2)
1 can be obtained in a
similar way and the approximated utilities follows since:
u˜1(α1, α2) = pR˜
(1)
1 (α1, α2) + (1− p)R˜
(2)
1 (α1, α2)
u˜2(α1, α2) = pR˜
(1)
2 (α1, α2) + (1− p)R˜
(2)
2 (α1, α2).
(25)
Now in order to solve the constrained optimization problem,
we introduce the Lagrange multipliers (λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4) ∈ [0,+∞[
4
and define the two functions:
L1(α1, α2, λ1) = −u˜1(α1, α2) + λ1(α1 −
1
p
)− λ2α1
L2(α1, α2, λ2) = −u˜2(α1, α2) + λ3(α2 −
1
1−p )− λ4α2.
(26)
The Kuhn-Tucker (KT) conditions can be written in the same
way as in (9). Therefore the optimum selfish power alloca-
tions can be obtained by using a fixed-point method and an
iterative algorithm following the same idea as in [8] for non-
coordinated MIMO MACs with single-user decoding. At this
point we have to make an important technical comment. Our
proof for the existence and uniqueness of the NE holds for
the exact game. For the approximated game, we need the ap-
proximated utilities to have the same properties as their exact
counterparts. It turns out that the large system approximation
of the ergodic mutual information can be shown to have the
desired properties [13].
Now, let us focus on the network sum-rate. As the opti-
mum precoding matrices are proportional to the identity ma-
trix, it can be checked that the sum-capacity of the consid-
ered decentralized MAC is reached for p = 0 and p = 1:
Rsum(p) = E log |I + ρ1H1H
H
1 + ρ2H2H
H
2 |. Unlike the
SISO case, it is not reached for any value of p. In partic-
ular, the fair choice p = 12 does not lead to a decentral-
ized network achieving the same sum-capacity of its central-
ized counterpart. We will quantify the corresponding sub-
optimality through simulation results.
3.4. Spatial power allocation game
In this section we assume that the user are free to share their
transmit power between their antennas but for each realization
of the coordination signal the transmit power is constrained
as follows: ∀k ∈ {1, 2},∀s ∈ {1, 2},Tr(Q
(s)
k ) ≤ Pk. This
means that we assume that the users cannot distribute their
power over time: they cannot decide the amount of power
they dedicate to a given realization of the coordination sig-
nal. The main feature of the game under the aforementioned
power constraint is that there exists a unique Nash equilibrium
in each sub-game defined by the realization of the coordina-
tion signal. The proof is much simpler than that of the time
power allocation problem since the use of Rosen’s Theorem
[9] is not required. Without loss of generality assume that
S = 1. Whatever the strategy of user 2, user 1 sees no mul-
tiple access interference. Theferore he can choose Q
(1)
1 in-
dependently of user 2. As R
(1)
1 (Q
(1)
1 ,Q
(1)
2 ) is a strictly con-
cave function to be maximized over a convex set, there is a
unique optimum strategy for user 1. As we assume a game
with complete information, user 2 knows the utility of user 1
and thus the precoding matrix he chooses. The same concav-
ity argument can be used for R
(1)
2 (Q
(1)
1 ,Q
(1)
2 ) and therefore
guarantees that user 2 will use a given precoding matrix.
Determination of the Nash equilibrium. In order to find
the optimum covariance matrices we proceed in the same way
as described in [8]. First we will focus on the optimum eigen-
vectors and then we will determine the optimum eigenvectors
by approximating the utility functions under the large system
assumption. In order to determine the optimum eigenvectors
the proof in [8] can be applied to our case to assert that there is
no loss of optimality by restricting the search for the optimum
covariance matrix by imposing the structureQk = UkPkUk,
where Tk = UkDkUk is the spectral decomposition of the
transmit correlation matrix defined in (13) and the diagonal
matrix Pk = Diag(Pk(1), ..., Pk(nt)) represents the powers
of user k allocated to the different eigenvectors.
As a consequence, we can exploit once again the results
of [12], assuming the asymptotic regime in terms of the num-
ber of antennas, defined in the previous subsection. The new
approximated utilities are:
R˜
(1)
1 =
nt∑
i=1
log2
[
1 + ρP
(1)
1 (i)d1(i)γ1
]
+
+
∑
j = 1nr log2
[
1 + ρd(R)(j)δ1
]
− ntργ1δ1 log2 e
R˜
(1)
2 =
2∑
l=1
nt∑
i=1
log2
[
1 + 2ρP
(1)
l (i)dl(i)γ2
]
+
+
nr∑
j=1
log2
[
1 + 2ρd(R)(j)δ2
]
− 4ntργ2δ2 log2 e−
−R˜
(1)
1
(27)
where dl, l ∈ {1, 2} are the vectors that contain the eigen-
values of the transmit correlation matrices Tl, d
(R) contains
the eigenvalues of the receive correlation matrix R. Also the
coefficients γ1, δ1, γ2,δ2 are the solutions of the following
systems 

γ1 =
1
nt
nr∑
j=1
d(R)(j)
1 + ρd(R)(j)δ1
δ1 =
1
nt
nt∑
i=1
P
(1)
1 (i)d1(i)
1 + ρP
(1)
1 (i)d1(i)1γ1
(28)


γ2 =
1
2nt
nr∑
j=1
d(R)(j)
1 + 2ρd(R)(j)δ2
δ2 =
1
2nt
2∑
l=1
nt∑
i=1
P
(1)
l (i)dl(i)
1 + 2ρP
(1)
l (i)dl(i)1γ2
(29)
Then, optimizing the approximated rates R˜
(1)
1 w. r. t. P
(1)
1 (i),
and then R˜
(1)
2 w.r.t. P
(1)
1 (i) leads to the following water-
filling equations:
P
(1),∗
1 (i) =
[
1
nr ln 2λ1
−
1
ρd1(i)γ1
]+
(30)
P
(1),∗
2 (i) =
[
1
nr ln 2λ2
−
1
ρd2(i)γ2
]+
(31)
where λk ≥ 0 and for user k is the Lagrangian multipliers
tuned in order to meet the power constraint given in (17):∑nt
i=1 P
(1)
k (i) = ntPk. We use the same iterative power allo-
cation algorithm as the one described in [8]. As we have men-
tioned in the previous subsection, the results of [13] show that
the approximated utilities are strictly concave, but also that if
the iterative power algorithm converges, it converges towards
the global maximum. We obtain in this case also that, under
the large systems assumption, the approximated utilities have
the same properties as the exact utilities.
One important point to notice here is that the obtained
optimum precoding matrices do not depend on p. This con-
siderably simplifies the base station’s choice for the sum-rate
optimal value for p. Indeed, the sum-rate Rsum(p) is merely
a linear function of p: Rsum(p) = ap + b where
a = E log |I + ρH1Q
(1),∗
1 H
H
1 + ρH2Q
(1),∗
2 H
H
2 |
−E log |I + ρH1Q
(2),∗
1 H
H
1 + ρH2Q
(2),∗
2 H
H
2 |
b = E log |I + ρH1Q
(2),∗
1 H
H
1 + ρH2Q
(2),∗
2 H
H
2 |.
(32)
Depending on the sign of a , if the base station wants to max-
imize the sum-rate it will choose p = 0 or p = 1. If it
wants a fair game it will choose p = 12 and accept a cer-
tain loss of global optimality. Note that even for p ∈ {0, 1}
the sum-capacity is not reached in general: this is because the
matrix Q
(1),∗
1 (resp. Q
(2),∗
2 ) does not coincide with the first
(resp. second) component of the pair of precoding matrices
that maximizes the (strictly concave) network sum-rate.
4. SIMULATION RESULTS
For the temporal power allocation problem we have seen that
the decentralized MAC depends on the rule of the game i.e.
the value of p. This is exactly what Fig. 1 depicts for the fol-
lowing scenario: P1 = 10, P2 = 1, ρ = 5 dB, nt = nr = 4.
First, we see that the MAC sum-rate is a convex function of
p and the maximum of Rsum(p) is reached for p = 0 and
p = 1. One important observation to be made is that the min-
imum and maximum only differ by about 1%. Many other
simulations have confirmed this observation. This shows that
the sub-optimality is not marked. This means that any game
rule can lead to a almost sum-rate optimal game, this holds in
particular for a fair game. Fig. 2 shows the set of rate pair
achieved by varying p from 0 to 1. The corresponding looks
like a straight line and is very close to the sum-rate line given
by the equation R1 + R2 = Csum where Csum is the cen-
tralized MAC sum-capacity. It is interesting to note that the
base station can, through a single parameter (i.e. p), force the
system to operate at different many points which corresponds
to relatively large ranges of of transmission rates. It is also
very interesting to note, that the fast MIMO MAC behaves
like a Gaussian SISO MAC in the sense that the capacity re-
gion border comprises a segment over which the sum-rate is
reached (up to a small error). This is not true for fast fad-
ing SISO MACs. Here, we observe the consequence of the
double averaging effect present in the considered utilities (er-
godic rates plus spatial averaging). This shows that, although
the ergodic capacity region of the centralizedMACwith CSIR
and CDIT is not known in general, it can be determined up to
a small relative error under the large system approximation
and therefore make possible the analysis of the decentralized
MAC.
Nowwe consider the purely spatial power allocation prob-
lem. We already know that the sum-rate is a linear function
of p and therefore is maximum in p = 0 or p = 1. It turns
out that this slope has a small value. This observation has
been confirmed by many simulation scenarios. This slope is
even 0 for a symmetric MAC i.e. P1 = P2 and T1 = T2.
This can be checked analytically by inspecting the sum-rate
expression. Fig. 3 shows the set of rate pairs achieved by
varying p for the scenario: P1 = 10, P2 = 1, ρ = 3 dB,
nt = nr = 5, t1 = t2 = 0.2 where tk is the correlation pa-
rameter that characterize the correlation matrix chosen to be
given by Tk(i, j) = t
|i−j|
k . Even in this scenario, chosen to be
a bad case in terms of sub-optimality, the sum-rate is not far
from the sum-capacity of the centralized MAC.
5. SUMMARY
In this contribution, we have provided a game-theoretic frame-
work for decentralized multiple access channels using a sim-
ple coordination mechanism. We have provided several in-
teresting theoretical and simulation results. First, we proved
the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium both for
decentralized Gaussian SISO and fast fading MIMO MACs.
We also provided the corresponding optimum selfish power
allocation policies. We have seen that the base station can,
through a single parameter (i.e. p ∈ [0, 1], which represents
the distribution of the coordination signal), force the system
to operate at different many points which corresponds to rel-
atively large ranges of of transmission rates. For Gaussian
MACs with single antenna terminals, the corresponding set
of rates corresponds to the full cooperation segment of the
centralized MAC. Said otherwise a decentralized Gaussian
SISO MAC with coordination achieves the same rate pairs as
a MAC with full cooperation or virtual MIMO system. As a
second step we wanted to know to what extent this key result
extends to fading MAC with multi-antenna terminals. It turns
out this is almost true in the MIMO setting. For the cases of
interest where the power was optimally allocated either over
space or time, the performance gap is relatively small. Inter-
estingly in large MIMOMACs, the capacity region comprises
a full cooperation segment just like SISO MACs. The coor-
dination signal precisely allows one to move along the cor-
responding (almost) straight line. This shows the relevance
of large systems in distributed networks since they allow to
determine the capacity region of certain systems whereas it is
unkwnown in the finite setting and also induce an averaging
effect, which makes the behavior or users predictible. Indeed,
in large MIMO MACs the knowledge of the CDIT does not
involve any performance w.r.t. the case with perfect CSIT.
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